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This Essay responds to Professor Brandon Garrett’s 
Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, and, in 
particular, his identification of the dire need to change the culture 
of disclosing forensic evidence. My work on forensics is—similarly 
to Garrett’s—rooted in both scholarship and litigation of wrongful 
convictions. From this perspective, I question whether prosecutors 
fully disclose forensics findings and whether defense attorneys 
understand these findings and their impact on a client’s case. To 
clarify forensic findings for the entire courtroom, this Essay 
suggests increased pre-trial discovery and disclosure of forensic 
evidence and forensic experts. Forensic analysts largely work in 
police-governed labs; therefore, this Essay also posits ways to 
ensure complete Brady compliance as well as obtain accurate and 
reliable forensic findings. Correctly understanding forensic 
findings can remedy a lack of transparency surrounding whether 
results were completely disclosed and whether the results support 
the testimony of lab analysts. Finally, to assist the court with its 
gate-keeping role of admitting forensic science disciplines and 
findings, this Essay recommends that courts appoint independent 
experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.  
 
 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law; Director, 
West Virginia Innocence Project. Many thanks to Ed Cheng for his thoughtful 
feedback on this piece and to Al Karlin and Nina Morrison for their steadfast 
representation of Joseph Buffey on his path to freedom. 
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“There is simply no room in our judicial system for unethical 
evidentiary gamesmanship.” 
- Justice Allen Hayes Loughry, Concurring in Buffey v. 
Ballard1  
I. Introduction 
Joseph Buffey was 19 years old when, on the advice of his 
attorney, he pled guilty to a rape and robbery he did not commit.2 
Only afterward did he learn that the DNA evidence exonerating 
him of the crime, and inculpating the true perpetrator, was 
available to prosecutors at the time Joe pled guilty.3 Thirteen 
years later, Joe was finally released from prison when the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled the prosecution should 
have disclosed the exculpatory DNA evidence pre-trial.4  
                                                                                                     
 1. 782 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 2015) (Loughry, J., concurring). 
 2.  See id. at 207–09 (describing the circumstances of Buffey’s plea 
decision). 
 3. Id. at 209. Joseph Buffey accepted an exploding plea offer on February 
6, 2002; on February 8, a lab analyst at the West Virginia State Police Crime 
Lab concluded that Buffey was not the assailant. Id. at 208. On February 9, the 
lab began to retest samples and came to the same conclusion. Id. The final 
concluded report was issued on April 5, 2002; Mr. Buffey was sentenced six 
weeks later on May 21, 2002. Id. at 209. 
 4. See id. at 221 (“Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that 
the State's failure to disclose favorable DNA test results obtained six weeks 
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This small case from West Virginia is the first decision 
nationally to require pre-trial disclosure of Brady material. The 
criminal justice system failed Joseph Buffey. But does blame fall 
on the prosecutors who failed to disclose the exculpatory DNA 
evidence and violated their duties under Brady? Or does it fall on 
the defense attorney who pressured Joe to take a plea deal and 
never followed up on requesting the forensic results?  
 Professor Brandon Garrett’s piece, Constitutional Regulation 
of Forensic Evidence,5 delves into a necessary cultural change: 
one of disclosure. Changing the culture of disclosure of 
forensics—by both the prosecution and the defense—can 
establish a more trustworthy system with fewer wrongful 
convictions. Garrett holds a distinguished position from which to 
examine wrongful convictions and their causes with his 
well-known work using data and case documentation to diagnose 
the causes of wrongful convictions.6 In Constitutional Regulation 
of Forensic Evidence, Garrett discusses how the Supreme Court 
edges toward greater disclosure of forensic evidence, while 
forensic disciplines are increasingly revealed as inaccurate or 
fallible.7 In his words, forensic findings are more important to 
court cases now while simultaneously recognized as less reliable.8 
Garrett reasonably argues for constitutional regulation of the 
disclosure of forensic evidence and due process requirements for 
discovery.  
This responsive Essay joins Garrett in calling for greater 
disclosure and in appealing to courts for greater recognition of 
faulty forensics and the barring of unreliable and inaccurate 
expert testimony. Driven by my own litigation of wrongful 
                                                                                                     
prior to the Petitioner's plea hearing violated the Petitioner's due process rights, 
to his prejudice.”).  
 5.  Brandon Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147 (2016). 
 6.  See generally BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) (reviewing the trial transcripts, 
hearing transcripts, and other records of over 200 DNA exoneration cases). 
 7.  See generally Garrett, supra note 5. 
 8.  See id. at 1149 (“The changing judicial understanding of the 
constitutional significance of forensic evidence in criminal cases may follow from 
a new appreciation that forensic evidence is not only increasingly important in 
criminal cases, but also that many traditional forensic techniques lack adequate 
reliability and validity.”).  
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convictions due to faulty forensic evidence, I ask even more of our 
courtroom actors: for prosecutors to adhere to their duties of 
disclosure both pre-trial under Brady and post-conviction under 
Professional Responsibility Rule 3.89 and for judges to use the 
tools at their disposal to ensure their own accurate 
understanding of scientific evidence presented at trial. These 
tools include appointing independent forensic experts under Rule 
of Evidence 70610 and Jason Kreag’s recommendation of a Brady 
colloquy,11 where judges ask prosecutors about their compliance 
with disclosure.  
II. The Supreme Court and a Necessary Cultural Change in 
Disclosure 
Professor Garrett identifies the necessary cultural change of 
disclosure by referencing the Supreme Court’s protection—and 
lack of protection—of due process rights regarding defense access 
to forensic evidence.12 According to Supreme Court precedent, 
there is no due process protection against destroying forensic 
evidence, no due process right for a defendant to access an expert, 
and, finally, no freestanding nonprocedural due process right to 
DNA evidence.13 However, the Supreme Court has supported a 
defendant’s right to confront lab analysts and forensic experts 
and has necessitated live testimony to explain forensic lab 
findings.14  
As Garrett notes, the Supreme Court has also heightened the 
obligations of defense counsel to litigate forensic evidence.15 In 
                                                                                                     
 9.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion 
Draft 1983) (setting forth eight separate special responsibilities of a prosecutor). 
 10.  FED. R. EVID. 706 (providing for court-appointed experts on a party’s 
motion or by the court on its own). 
 11.  Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 47–58 
(2014–2015). 
 12.  Garrett, supra note 5, at 1156. 
 13.  See Garrett, supra note 5, at 1148 nn.1–3 (describing shortcomings in 
the due process rights of the criminally accused). 
 14. See id. at 1148 & n.6 (citing Williams, Bullcoming, and Melendez-Diaz, 
which “tightened requirements to present live testimony in the courtroom”). 
 15.  Id. at 1149 (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081(2014)). 
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Hinton v. Alabama,16 the Supreme Court chastised defense 
counsel for failing to request a forensic expert, noting “criminal 
cases will arise where the only reasonable and available defense 
strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of 
expert evidence.”17 And yet, is the back and forth—between the 
failure of defense attorneys to discover forensic evidence and the 
failure of prosecutors to disclose Brady evidence—ultimately 
helpful to ensure disclosure and examination of forensic findings?  
Garrett answers yes: defense culture is changing, and it 
increasingly trains defense attorneys on forensics.18 Lower courts 
identify the failure to investigate forensics or obtain experts as 
ineffective assistance of counsel.19 With fewer and fewer cases 
going to trial, defense counsel has a greater responsibility to 
investigate forensics early in the face of a plea bargain.20 The 
Supreme Court may ultimately determine that when counsel fails 
to request a Daubert hearing or query forensic evidence pre-trial, 
this dereliction is equally as damaging as failing to cross-examine 
experts at trial. The determination that counsel is effective, or 
not, is tied to “reasonableness under prevailing processional 
norms,”21 and those norms are changing.  
III. Prosecutors’ Ethical Obligations to Disclose 
A. Prosecutorial Disclosure Pre-Trial 
Prosecutorial culture, on the other hand, appears slower to 
change. Professor Garrett correctly points out the failure of 
prosecutors to disclose forensic discovery.22 His article also notes 
that the ABA advises that full documentation from forensic labs 
should be disclosed—the underlying methods and files for the 
                                                                                                     
 16.  134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014). 
 17.  Id. at 1088 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011)).  
 18.  Garrett, supra note 5, at 1176. 
 19.  See id. at 1167–70 (outlining determinations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in lower courts due to attorney errors regarding forensic evidence). 
 20.  Id. at 1171. 
 21.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 22.  Garrett, supra note 5, at 1180–82. 
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analysis, not simply the results.23 As Garrett notes, this parallels 
the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause rulings, requiring the 
presence of an analyst to testify rather than the bare results of 
the analysis.24 When prosecutors are the only individuals with 
full access to the forensic findings and the underlying methods 
and files, the same bias and tunnel vision that plagues 
prosecutors in their refusal to re-examine cases post-conviction 
can likewise play a detrimental role in the initial prosecution. 
Our court system is now dependent on plea bargains to 
function.25 As Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York 
remarked, the plea bargaining system is unjust, excessive, and 
“so totally untransparent it is going to lead to some serious 
mistakes.”26 These mistakes have already been made: the 
National Registry of Exonerations has found that 40% of people 
exonerated in 2015 were convicted based on taking a guilty plea; 
these cases range from drug crimes to homicides.27 One easy and 
effective solution to more informed plea agreements is open case-
file discovery.28 A closed-file system exacerbates timing concerns 
                                                                                                     
 23.  Id. at 1180 n.142. 
 24.  See generally Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305 (2009).  
 25.  See generally Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1277 (2016) (discussing the increasingly prominent role plea bargaining 
has in our criminal justice system). A substantial majority of criminal cases are 
resolved by guilty pleas; thus, plea bargaining is “not some adjunct to the 
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 
S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
 26.  Judge Jed Rakoff, S.D.N.Y., Keynote Address at the Eleventh Annual 
H.F. Guggenhein Symposium at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice: 
Making Room for Justice: Crime, Public Safety & the Choices Ahead for 
Americans (Feb. 26, 2016); see also Adam Wisnieski, A ‘Draconian’ System 
Where the Innocent Plead Guilty, JOHN JAY COLLEGE, 
http://thecrimereport.org/2016/02/29/2016-guggenheim-3/ (last visited Feb. 4, 
2016) (reporting on Judge Rakoff’s keynote address) (on file with Washington & 
Lee Law Review). 
 27.  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015, at 1 (2016), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_201
5.pdf.  
 28.  This was noted recently in an empirical study comparing the open-file 
system of North Carolina with the closed-file system of Virginia. See Jenia I. 
Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal 
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016). 
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and disclosure issues by allowing prosecutors to only produce 
critical evidence on the eve of, or at, trial.29  
In response to wrongful convictions caused by prosecutorial 
misconduct, the Texas legislature passed the Michael Morton Act 
in 2013 requiring open file discovery.30 The Act requires 
prosecutors to disclose any information favorable to the defense, 
including exculpatory, impeaching, and mitigating evidence.  This 
disclosure is required “as soon as practicable” after the 
prosecution receives a request, and extends even after conviction. 
This Act serves as an example of open-file discovery, and its 
implementation has highlighted resistance by some prosecutors 
to comply.  Indeed, the State Bar of Texas recently issued an 
ethics opinion chastising prosecutors who attempt to circumvent 
the Act by requiring defendants give up discovery rights in 
exchange for a plea offer.31 
Perhaps these prosecutors are concerned because in cases of 
a plea agreement, the prosecutor may not have yet examined the 
case as fully as she would in preparation for trial, and may not 
have even discovered Brady evidence, particularly forensic 
evidence.32  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 provides 
prosecutors with some discovery leeway for forensics.  Rule 16 
only requires discovery of scientific reports and examinations if 
                                                                                                     
 29.  See id. at 303 (describing closed-file jurisdictions). It should be noted 
that in their research, even with the open-file discovery system, relevant 
information is frequently missing from the file; see also Miriam H. Baer, Timing 
Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015) (“A number of state jurisdictions . . . 
make the trial the ‘focal point’ of their discovery and disclosure rules.”). 
 30.  See Brandi Grissom, Perry Signs Michael Morton Act, Tex. Tribune 
(May 16, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/05/16/gov-rick-perry-signs-
michael-morton-act/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (discussing the “measure that 
aims to avoid wrongful convictions by preventing prosecutors from suppressing 
evidence”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 31. See TEXAS APPLESEED, TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE v (2015), 
http://texasdefender.org/wp-
content/uploads/Towards_More_Transparent_Justice.pdf (reporting that some 
prosecutors require “that defendants waive the right to discovery in exchange 
for a favorable plea, or that defendants forfeit other rights in exchange for 
accessing discovery”).  The State Bar found that these “waivers” violate the 
Texas Rules of Professional Conduct.  Id. 
 32.  See Baer, supra note 29, at 44 (“If ninety-five percent of the defendant 
pool pleads guilty, then resource-deprived prosecutors should rationally delay 
some of their preparation for trial until they know for sure whether a given 
defendant plans to plead not guilty.”). 
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such evidence “is material to preparing the defense” or “the 
government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial.”33  
At the time of a plea, a prosecutor may only have given a cursory 
glance at crime lab results. 
The expectation of prosecutors is changing. Joseph Buffey’s 
case is particularly instructive as the first coherent opinion 
requiring Brady disclosure of exculpatory—not impeachment— 
evidence during plea negotiations before trial.34 While the U.S. 
Supreme Court has ruled impeachment evidence does not need to 
be disclosed in plea negotiations,35 the Court has not ruled on 
exculpatory evidence. The West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals ruled that the constitutional due process rights in Brady 
extend to the plea negotiation stage of criminal proceedings.36 
The Court found “that the DNA results were favorable, 
suppressed, and material”; thus nondisclosure violated Buffey’s 
due process rights and was prejudicial.37 In Justice Loughry’s 
concurrence, he stated that Brady disclosure requirements 
“extend to evidence in the State’s control that is favorable to the 
defendant regardless of whether a plea agreement or trial 
ensues.”38 Furthermore, the Court found that the evidence does 
not need to be exonerative, and the standard for materiality “does 
not require a demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure 
of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the 
defendant’s acquittal.”39  
                                                                                                     
 33.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F)(iii).  
 34.  Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 212–18 (2015) (examining the 
applicability of Brady to the plea negotiation stage). 
 35.  See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002) (“Although the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments provide, as part of the Constitution’s ‘fair trial’ 
guarantee, that defendants have the right to receive exculpatory impeachment 
material from prosecutors, . . . a defendant who pleads guilty foregoes a fair trial 
as well as various other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
 36.  Buffey, 782 S.E.2d at 218. 
 37.  See id. (“We find that the DNA results were favorable, suppressed, and 
material to the defense. Thus, the Petitioner's due process rights, as enunciated 
in Brady, were violated by the State's suppression of that exculpatory 
evidence.”). 
 38.  Id. at 221 (Loughry, J., concurring). 
 39.  Id. at 212 (majority opinion). 
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B. Prosecutorial Ethical Obligations Post-Conviction 
When discussing prosecutorial disclosure, prosecutors face a 
different ethical standard than defense attorneys. Prosecutors do 
not represent an individual client; rather, they represent the 
state and the government. The duty of a prosecutor is to ensure 
justice, even if that means “losing” an individual case. Under the 
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8:  
[A] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice 
and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries 
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is 
accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are 
taken to prevent and rectify the conviction of innocent 
persons.40  
This responsibility requires disclosure of evidence that helps a 
defendant and undermines the state’s case.  
In 2008, the ABA amended Rule 3.8 to affirmatively require 
a prosecutor to disclose evidence of a defendant’s innocence found 
after the conviction.41 A minister of justice seeks the truth 
whether before or after a conviction. And yet while the fear of 
wrongful convictions has galvanized defense attorneys to 
advocate more robustly for clients and has led courts to chastise a 
lack of defense, prosecutors often remain planted all the more 
firmly in their original positions. Instead of “seek[ing] to remedy 
                                                                                                     
 40.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 41.  Id. at r. 3.8: 
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence 
creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not 
commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the 
prosecutor shall: (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate 
court or authority, and (2) if the conviction was obtained in the 
prosecutor’s jurisdiction, (i) promptly disclose that evidence to the 
defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and (ii) undertake further 
investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to 
determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the 
defendant did not commit.  
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence 
establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was 
convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the 
prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction. 
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the conviction,”42 prosecutors challenge the testing of DNA 
evidence, argue against its relevancy, and often re-bring charges 
if a conviction is reversed in court. Indeed, less than half the 
states have adopted—or even considered—Rule 3.8 (g) and (h) for 
state law.43 Prosecutors proclaim the amendments are insulting 
and resent the insinuation of poor behavior.  
Insinuations? In Joseph Buffey’s case, prosecutors re-filed 
the exact same charges as soon as the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals vacated them—even after they had prosecuted 
and convicted the true perpetrator, identified by DNA, of the 
same single-assailant crime.44 Instead of following Rule 3.8’s 
admonition that “guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence” and that prosecutors are obliged to “rectify the 
conviction of innocent persons,” prosecutors in Clarksburg, West 
Virginia,45 convicted the true perpetrator, Adam Bowers, of this 
single-assailant crime46 and then re-charged Buffey with the 
same assault. Additionally, prosecutors charged Joe with 
statutory rape from 2002 because as a 19-year-old he fathered a 
child with his then 14-year-old girlfriend.47 To avoid being 
registered as a sex offender for life, Joe took an Alford plea48 to 
                                                                                                     
 42.  Id. at r. 3.8(h). 
 43.   See CPR Policy Implementation Committee Report: Rule 3.8(g) and (h), 
AM BAR ASS’N (Sept. 1, 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_respo
nsibility/mrpc_3_8_g_h.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 44.  See Joseph Buffey Agrees to Plea Deal, Freed After 15 Years in Prison, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http://www.wvgazettemail.com/news-cops-and-courts/20161011/joseph-buffey-
agrees-to-plea-deal-freed-after-15-years-in-prison [hereinafter GAZETTE-MAIL] 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (reporting on Buffey’s Kennedy plea in response to the 
renewed charges) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45.  Specifically, these prosecutors were David Romano and Cindy Romano, 
Harrison County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney. 
 46.  Clarksburg Man Sentenced After Raping and Robbing 83-Year-Old 
Woman, 12 NEWS-WBOY (Sept. 2, 2015), 
http://www.wvalways.com/story/29946684/clarksburg-man-sentenced-after-
raping-and-robbing-83-year-old-woman (last updated Sept. 14, 2015) (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2017) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 47.  GAZETTE-MAIL, supra note 44. 
 48.  An Alford plea, known in West Virginia as a Kennedy plea, is where the 
defendant does not concede guilt but instead concedes the state would have 
enough evidence to find him guilty. For the genesis of this sort of plea 
agreement, see generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  
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the original crime he did not commit, and the state dropped the 
statutory rape charge. Thirteen years after his original 
conviction, Joseph Buffey pled guilty49—again—to a crime he did 
not commit on October 11, 2016. In his own words, he told the 
court he did not commit the crime, but thought it was in his best 
interest to plead guilty.50 As is often the case in these 
re-prosecutions, the prosecutors asked only for a sentence of time 
served. 
Professor Keith Findley has documented the accompanying 
“time served” plea offer to re-brought charges, usually for 
particularly heinous and memorable crimes.51 Do even the 
prosecutors believe the person they re-charged committed the 
crime if they are allowing a perpetrator to be free on the streets? 
Yet prosecutors can be reluctant to consent even to DNA testing 
to determine if the convicted person is truly guilty. Although 
courts are increasingly receptive to allowing DNA testing to 
determine the true perpetrator, prosecutors continue to oppose it. 
In Charles “Manny” Kilmer’s case,52 although the FBI 
admitted to its analyst falsely testifying and offered free DNA 
testing to rectify this false testimony, the local state prosecutor 
objected to the testing. Are the people of West Virginia and the 
citizens of that county well represented when their ministers of 
justice insist on expending significant state resources to seek an 
                                                                                                     
 49.  Mike Valentine, Joseph Buffey Enters Alford Plea, Walks Free, 5 NEWS 
WDTV.COM (Oct. 11, 2016 11:43 AM), 
http://www.wdtv.com/content/news/Charges-dismissed-against-Joseph-Buffey--
396651991.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 50.  GAZETTE-MAIL, supra note 44. 
 51. Keith Findley, Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin 
School of Law, Reconvicting the Innocent? Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of a 
New Trial (Nov. 21, 2015). 
 52.  As we said in our brief in support of Manny Kilmer: 
There is no possible downside to allowing the FBI to perform DNA 
testing at zero cost to the State of West Virginia. There is certainly a 
downside to continuing to try to prevent a seventy-one-year-old man 
who has asserted his innocence for the past two-and-a-half decades 
from obtaining DNA testing, especially in light of the Circuit Court of 
Berkeley County’s order granting testing and the FBI’s offer to 
provide testing.  
Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Kilmer v. Ballard, 
No. 15-C-351 (W. Va. 2016). 
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extraordinary remedy to fight against DNA testing that the FBI 
has offered to perform at absolutely no cost to the state?  
Manny Kilmer was convicted in 1991 of murdering Sharon 
Lewis in Martinsburg, West Virginia.  His case involves a coerced 
confession, a snitch, poor lawyering, and improper forensic 
science exacerbated by false scientific testimony.53  If the 
prosecuting attorneys are as confident as they profess that 
Manny perpetrated the murder of Sharon Lewis, then the FBI 
has offered them a way to confirm, once and for all, the integrity 
of the conviction. On the other hand, if there is any doubt 
whether the right person was convicted, a prosecutor would 
presumably be eager to allow the FBI to perform DNA testing to 
correct a manifest injustice. The prosecutors are unable to 
explain how allowing DNA testing could cause harm to the state. 
Opposing testing not only disregards the prosecutor’s duty as a 
minister of justice, it also wastes valuable state resources.  
In summary, prosecutors hold a duty to disclose evidence of 
innocence under Rule 3.8 and also to serve as ministers of justice 
rather than simply as advocates. Their duty to uphold justice 
extends after a conviction, particularly when evidence exposes a 
wrongful conviction.  The disclosure of forensic evidence is key to 
an accurate conviction and to upholding the requirements of the 
position as prosecuting attorney. 
IV. Solutions for Judges 
Professor Garrett’s timely piece discussing the culture of 
disclosure coincides with a recent report by the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 
questioning the reliability of certain forensic disciplines.54 The 
report, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific 
Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, made eight 
recommendations for the FBI, the Attorney General, the 
                                                                                                     
 53. See generally id. (describing what had happened to Kilmer).   
 54.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC 
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judiciary, and science-based agencies. These recommendations 
emphasized the need for objective analysis and empirical 
research on the accuracy and consistency of forensic results, the 
challenging duty of the court to evaluate expert testimony, and 
the need for established standards for validity and reliability in 
forensic science disciplines.55 The forensic disciplines receiving 
the most focus in the Report are bite marks, fingerprints, 
firearms, mixture samples of DNA, and footwear. PCAST was 
particularly concerned—as was the National Academy of Sciences 
in their 2009 report on forensics56—with independent scientists 
providing analyses rather than police labs and the gate-keeping 
role of judges in admitting reliable evidence. To assist judges in 
this role, PCAST recommended “best practices” and training 
materials for judges on understanding scientific standards for 
validity. The Attorney General and the FBI—the prosecutors and 
the police—rejected PCAST’s recommendations.57 
I suggest that courts appoint independent experts to evaluate 
forensic evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. While this 
has been rarely done, an independent expert can assist judges in 
their gate-keeping role, particularly with ongoing changes in 
science. In Jackson v. Pollion,58 a the Seventh Circuit prisoner 
health case, Judge Richard Posner suggests the same and 
lambasts the legal profession to “get over its fear and loathing of 
science.”59 Under Rule 706, parties may submit nominations and 
the court may on its own motion appoint an expert.60 
                                                                                                     
 55.  Indeed, the Report closely tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
requirements on admitting experts. 
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Furthermore, this court appointment of an expert does not 
prevent the parties from calling their own experts, should they 
choose to do so.61 Because judges have an obligation under 
Daubert to act as gatekeepers to exclude invalid science, a Rule 
706 impartial court-appointed expert would assist in judges 
fulfilling that duty. Indeed, in a concurrence to General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner, Justice Breyer recommended that “[j]udges should 
be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their inherent 
authority . . . to appoint experts . . . . Reputable experts could be 
recommended to courts by established scientific organizations, 
such as the National Academy of Sciences or the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science.”62 But, twenty years 
later, district courts remain largely reluctant to use these tools.  
An independent expert appointed by a judge, with equal 
access to the expert for all courtroom actors, may ensure more 
accurate results and more complete documentation, particularly 
if labs remain entrenched in police departments. The lack of 
independent crime labs is an ongoing issue, seven years after the 
National Academy of Sciences recommended crime labs be 
removed from police control.63  
A final suggestion particular to disclosure, put forward by 
Professor Jason Kreag, is for courts to routinely ask prosecutors if 
they have disclosed Brady evidence pre-trial.64 In this “Brady 
colloquy,” the judge questions the prosecutor about her 
compliance with disclosure on the record. Some prosecutors 
refute the idea of a Brady colloquy, insisting that this questioning 
is demeaning, and they are insulted by the inference of not 
complying with their duties.65 The reality of opposition to DNA 
                                                                                                     
 61.  FED. R. EVID. 706(E). 
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testing, re-filing debunked charges, and retributive actions 
against defendants who have been proven innocent lessen the 
alleged insult of these questions, in my opinion. Even Judge 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has opined, “There is an epidemic of 
Brady violations abroad in the land . . . only judges can put a stop 
to it.”66 A Brady colloquy is yet another tool for judges to ensure 
accurate disclosure, the first step to admitting accurate forensics 
in the courtroom.  
V. Conclusion 
Professor Garrett is correct in recognizing the need for a 
cultural change in disclosure of forensic evidence and greater 
responsibility placed on not simply the defense but also on the 
prosecution to present accurate evidence.  
Ultimately, all courtroom players need to own a sense of 
responsibility to act and to ensure valid and reliable forensic 
evidence is presented in the courtroom and that these forensic 
findings are disclosed to defendants. All courtroom players can 
and need to work to exonerate the innocent and prevent their 
wrongful convictions in the first place.  
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